Our results provide strong support for the anticipation and transfer of information throughout a bidder's industry at the announcement of initial bidding activity. First, the abnormal returns of bidding firms are significantly positively related to the length of time between bids in an industry. Abnormal returns for less anticipated bids are 64 basis points higher than those for more anticipated bids. Second, at the time of an initial industry bid, rivals that will bid in the future experience significant price adjustments in comparison to non-bidding rivals.
Introduction
Does the market anticipate bidding activity? If it does, then it is difficult to interpret announcement returns as measuring the effects of bidding. Moreover, since the magnitude of commonly measured bidding returns are close to zero, any anticipation effect has the potential to drastically alter perceived wisdom about bidding. In this paper, we present evidence consistent with anticipation of bidding activity. The evidence is pervasive across different types of bids and consistent with the interpretation that bidding is a wealth creating activity. Abnormal returns for less anticipated bids are significantly positive. These results could help explain why bidders continue acquisition activity in spite of extensive literature reporting zero or negative returns.
We also show that at the time of an initial industry bid, the market reaction to a rival depends on whether the firm will also bid in the future. We explore alternate explanations for these results, but none eliminates the anticipation argument.
The announcement of a bid has the potential to signal information to firms throughout the industry where the bid is announced. To the best of our knowledge, an analysis of anticipation throughout the industry of a bidding firm does not exist.
1 Nevertheless, Hou (2006) finds that industries are "the primary channel for news dissemination in the equity market." Information released by an acquisition announcement may impact all firms in an industry, or be specific to the act of bidding. If subsequent bidding by a rival is anticipated at the time of an earlier industry bid, the subsequent announcement period 1 The early literature on program bidders studies anticipation but is focused on sequential bids by a single firm. However, research has addressed the stock price reaction of rivals of target firms. Eckbo (1983 Eckbo ( , 1985 Eckbo ( , 1992 , Stillman (1983) , Eckbo and Wier (1985) , and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) , find that rivals of acquisition targets earn significant, positive abnormal returns. Fee and Thomas (2004) document significant reactions to firms involved in product-market relationships with bidders and targets. Song and Walkling (2000) find that rivals of target firms experience abnormal returns to the extent that they are also likely to be targets. returns for that rival will not accurately reflect the value of bidding activity.
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This research develops and tests the "bidder anticipation hypothesis" as it relates to bidding firms and their rivals. Unlike tests of program announcements by a specific firm, we develop our tests within industries of bidding firms. Our premise is that acquisition bids preceded by a long industry dormant period (without acquisition bids) are less likely to be anticipated. This is the same technique used to measure surprise for rivals of targets in Song and Walkling (2000) .
Using a sample of 3,389 acquisitions from 1985 to 2001, we find strong support for the bidder anticipation hypothesis. Abnormal returns to bidders are significantly related to the length of the dormant period. The first bidder in an industry after a minimum twelve month dormant period experiences significantly positive abnormal announcement returns averaging 0.69%. In contrast, and typical of the literature, the average abnormal return to all bidders is an insignificant 0.18%. In cases with less than a twelve month dormant period between acquisitions, the average abnormal return to the next bidder is an insignificant 0.05%. Moreover, rivals who will also bid in the future earn abnormal returns at the time of the initial bid in the industry that adjust in sign, magnitude and proportion to the abnormal returns of the respective initial industry bidder.
Our results are consistent with the interpretation that bidding activity for less anticipated acquisitions is (on average) a wealth creating activity. This is in contrast to the negative or zero abnormal returns documented in the literature. As one example of this, we find that the abnormal returns to bidders in stock offers are negative and consistent with the literature. However, returns in less anticipated stock offers are significantly positive. Similarly, while the literature reports significantly negative abnormal returns to bidders seeking to acquire publicly traded firms, these bidders earn insignificant returns in less anticipated acquisitions. These results do not negate the importance of form of payment or the target's organizational structure, but they do indicate the existence and relative importance of anticipation effects.
Our approach is distinct from methodologies examining the clustering of acquisitions and merger waves. Initial bids do not have to be followed by additional bids in their industry and waves are often preceded by bids of rival firms. Our results also hold after controlling for form of payment, organizational form, target attitude, target nationality, multiple bidders, offer outcome, merger waves, and other attributes associated with bidder returns in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and provides a development of the bidder anticipation hypothesis. Section 3 describes our methodology and sample. Univariate and multivariate tests relating abnormal returns to the length of the dormant period are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we examine the extent to which the returns of rival firms react at the time of an initial industry bid. Section 6 discusses alternate interpretations. Section 7 concludes.
Background and hypotheses

Bidder Returns
The financial literature has long been intrigued with understanding the magnitude and factors affecting abnormal returns to bidding firms. Jensen and Ruback (1983) , Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) , Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) summarize a large body of evidence spanning four decades and report that the unconditional announcement period return to bidders is generally zero or slightly negative. 3 For example, Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) report that bidder abnormal returns for acquisitions spanning the 1973-98 period average -0.7%. Bidding returns are also negative in each of the three sub periods analyzed. Bradley and Sundaram (2004) find significant superior performance for bidders acquiring US firms during the 1990s, but only when the pre-announcement period is included. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) report that bidders from the US earn insignificant returns when acquiring Canadian Firms. Roll (1986) , Jensen (2004) , and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue the influence of hubris and overvaluation as explanations for bidder returns. Other factors affecting bidder returns include form of payment [Travlos (1987) , Huang and Walkling (1987) , and Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) ], and organizational form and nationality of the target [Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2004) , Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) Moeller, Stulz (2003a, 2003b) ]. Finally, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2005) report a significant negative relation between the existence of anti-takeover provisions and acquirer returns.
Anticipation effects
An early literature on program bids reports mixed results. Schipper and Thompson (1983) , Malatesta and Thompson (1985) , and Loderer and Martin, (1990) suggest that future bids are anticipated at the time an acquisition program is announced. Alternatively, Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) find that bidding firms earn significant returns preceding each of their first four bids. More recently, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that during the 1990's the order of the acquisitions does not affect excess returns to frequent bidders. Similarly, Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes, (2004) find that returns from multiple U.K. acquirers are similar to those from single acquirers. Billet and Qian (2005) report that acquirers of second and higher order deals experience significantly more negative returns and attribute this result to managerial overconfidence. Becher (2004) finds that the market anticipates subsequent bidding by banks around the passage of merger related banking regulation. Song and Walkling (2000) note that rivals of targeted firms experience contemporaneous positive abnormal returns to the extent they are likely to be targeted themselves. 4 While not a formal analysis of anticipation effects, the acquisition probability model of Palepu (1986) recognizes the possibility of their existence by including an explanatory dummy variable set equal to one if an acquisition occurred in a firm's industry in the previous 12 months.
Merger waves and dormant periods
4 The contagion literature also recognizes the anticipation effect across many venues.
The concept of merger anticipation is related to (but distinct from) evidence that acquisitions cluster by industry. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) report clustering for target firms. At the industry level, 50% of the targets they examine over the 1982-89 period are concentrated in 25% of the years. Andrade and Stafford (2004) provide preliminary evidence that clustering occurs for bidders. Harford (2005) suggests that the industry merger wave is an efficient response to industry specific shocks. On average, mergers occurring during waves are associated with significantly positive wealth gains; mergers in the same industry, (1969) who suggests that exogenous shocks to an industry provide opportunities for consolidation and expansion. The occurrence of acquisition activity after a long period without such activity could signal an industry wide revaluation of targets (as in Song and Walkling, 2000) or bidders, as examined in this paper. Akbulut and Matsusaka (2003) report that the means and medians of combined target and bidder returns for diversifying acquisitions are significantly positive during waves and insignificantly different from zero outside of the waves. Mean and median bidding firm returns are insignificantly negative both inside and outside of waves.
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Our approach is different from the analysis of merger waves. Instead, we follow Song and Walkling (2000) by using the length of dormant periods (without bidding activity) within an industry as a proxy for the degree of surprise about an acquisition. While there is likely to be some positive relation between clustering and dormant periods, one need not be associated with the other. Merger waves are generally based on statistical concentrations of acquisition activity within an industry. These concentrations are useful but do not recognize industry activity preceding a wave. Clustering of bidding within an industry may be preceded by a long or short dormant period. For example, there are many cases 5 Additional research on merger waves is contained in Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2004) .
where another industry bid precedes the beginning of a wave as identified by Harford (2005) . Moreover, a long dormant period can be followed by an intense cluster of activity (i.e., an industry wave) or the absence of additional activity.
A simple model
Although we are interested in the act of bidding, for the moment we will keep our discussion of anticipation effects general, referring to any future event. The anticipated value of a future event is embedded into current stock prices being simply the weighted average of predicted future benefits from the event and the predicted future probabilities. More formally, assume that by time t-1 the event has not occurred. Let Ψ t represent the benefits anticipated from the event occurring at time t and let Ω t represent the probability of the event at that time. Then the value of the firm at time t-1 related to the future event,
defined here as V -1 will be:
Since the event has not occurred at time t-1, Ω -1 is revealed to be zero so
Assume for a specific firm b, the event actually occurs at time zero. At that time,
where the primes indicate revised benefits and probabilities associated with the event. The announcement effect associated with the event is:
For a firm that announces the event at time period t=0, Ω b0 ' = 1. Therefore rearranging terms,
Thus, the announcement effect consists of 3 parts corresponding to the 3 terms on the right hand side of equation (4). The first term Ψ b0 (1 -Ω b0 ) represents the benefit previously expected from the event times the revision in probability of the event. That is, the parenthetical phrase (1 -Ω b0 ) represents the market surprise over the event. Previously, the probability of the event was estimated at Ω b0 and it is now revealed to be 1.
The second term, ∝ b0 , represents the change in the benefits associated with the event. In the case of an acquisition announcement, it is typical for significant new information to be revealed. This includes the identity of the target, the form of payment, the bid premia and other specific information. Any or all of these specific pieces of information could alter the expectation about the acquisition benefit and will be incorporated in ∝ b0 .
In a classic anticipation model [Malatesta and Thompson (1985) ] prices adjust toward an anticipated future value to the extent the event is expected. When the event is announced, the remaining price adjustment occurs consistent with the Ψ b0 (1 -Ω b0 ) term of our model. If no other information is released, the sign of the return at anticipation and at consummation would be the same. However, clearly, the magnitude of the second term of the equation, ∝ b0 , representing the expected change in benefits due to new information (e.g., form of payment, bid premia, etc) has the potential to dominate the announcement return. Thus, the signs of the returns at anticipation and realization of the event could differ.
The third term
is the summation of the change in expected benefits from future events due to the current bid announced by firm b. For example, the act of bidding and the nature of a specific bid today may alter the market's expectation of the probability, form, and benefits of future acquisitions by this bidder. This would be reflected in this third term.
Hypotheses
Thus, the degree to which the event is unanticipated, the revision in future expected benefits due to the current event, and the change in benefits associated with the current event ( ∝ b0 ) drive the announcement 6 A simple example will illustrate. Suppose, at time t-1 some catalyst (here a bid by another firm in the industry) causes a 10% revision in the probability a rival will bid next period. Suppose the benefit associated with this anticipated bid is 1%. The expected benefit at time t-1 is .1%. If the bid is announced next period (and new information is not released) the remaining unanticipated effect of .9% is realized. However, it is common for additional information to be released. Knowledge that the firm is paying stock or offering a very large bid premia may not be anticipated. Realization of these facts could easily swamp the .9% and produce a negative announcement return. The point is that the signs of the announced and realized returns could differ and still be consistent with anticipation. returns. One simple factor that can influence the expectation of bidding is the existence of other bids by rival firms. The motivation for this can be traced back to Palepu (1986) . When a bid is announced, information is released that can affect the probability of bids by related firms. In industries where bids have recently occurred, the next bid announcement is less of a surprise. Our first hypothesis tests whether abnormal returns to bidding firms are related to the length of time since a previous bid by a firm in the same industry (the dormant period).
The absolute value of announcement period abnormal returns to bidding firms will increase with the length of the dormant period.
Other factors known to be related to bidding firm returns (e.g., form of payment, whether the target is public, etc.) are captured by ∝ b0 . Since these control variables relate to the signed, rather than absolute value of abnormal returns, we first test hypothesis one using the signed rather than absolute value of announcement returns. This combines wealth creating with wealth destroying bids and biases against finding a significant relation between dormant periods and abnormal returns. However, we also discuss results for the absolute value of abnormal returns as well as subsets of bids associated with positive and negative announcement period abnormal returns.
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The second and third hypotheses test for anticipation effects by looking at the returns to rival firms around the time of an initial industry bid. Rivals are most closely aligned with the event firm and most likely to be affected by its announcement.
Revisions in expected benefits from an event can be affected by relevant information surrounding the announcement of a competitor's event. For a rival firm r that does not announce the event at time period t=0, Ω r0 ' = 0. Thus, the announcement effect expected for these firms can be expressed as:
Since we are testing the return to rivals after a dormant period exceeding twelve months, we expect the magnitude of the first term to be small. (This first term represents the wealth change from the realization that the rival firm has not bid at this time.) Information released by an initial industry bid will impact the summation term which represents the change in expected future benefits for a rival firm. If the information released by an initial announcement is specific to bidding, and if the market discerns which firms are likely to follow with their own bids, the returns of subsequently bidding rivals will be significantly different from non-bidding rivals. However, information released by an initial industry bid could signal other factors related to valuation of the industry (e.g., inefficient investment, lack of internal growth opportunities, etc.).
In the case of industry wide information, the prices of all rivals will adjust. The second hypothesis tests whether a) returns to rivals at the time of an initial industry bid are significantly different from zero and b) the market differentiates subsequent bidders from non-bidding rivals at the time of an initial industry bid. announcements can result in price adjustments that bias against our finding significant abnormal returns. Boone and Mulherin (2006) report that 13% of the firms in their sample had multiple public bidders.
However, about half of these firms disclose private negotiations with other potential bidders in SEC documents. Finally, investors may anticipate bids through other means (e.g., a predictive model) without reference to dormant periods. All of these reasons work against our finding significant results.
Research design and sample characteristics
Sample selection
We use the SDC database to identify both domestic and international acquisition bids above $10 million by US bidders over the period 1/1/1985 through 12/31/2001. This produces an initial sample of 14,564 deals. We delete financial firms and utilities (CRSP SIC codes 6000 through 6999 and 4900 through 4999) and cases where CRSP SIC codes or CRSP returns are not available to calculate abnormal returns as well as 249 cases where multiple bids occur within an industry on the same day. 9 To avoid spurious results from industries with little acquisition activity, we also delete bidders in four-digit CRSP industries containing less than five firms or in industries where less than five acquisitions occurred over the sample period. We note that our conclusions are unaltered if we further restrict our analyses to industries with larger numbers of acquisitions. Our screening rules produce a sample of 3,389 firms.
9 It is problematic to determine which of these bids occurred first. Retaining these cases does not alter our results.
The first three columns of Table 1 show the distribution of acquisition bids over the sample period. The largest concentration of bids occur in the 1997 through 2000 period. However, the percentage of acquisitions never exceeds 13% of the entire sample in any year. The fourth column of Table 1 indicates the number of different four-digit SIC industries participating in bidding activity in a particular year. Thus, in 1985 fifty (4-digit SIC) industries had at least one bidder attempting an acquisition. These numbers increase substantially throughout the 1990's, consistent with the increase in acquisition activity previously noted. Across the sample, our firms are distributed across 313 unique 4-digit SIC codes. 
Defining dormant periods and abnormal dormant periods
Our first anticipation hypothesis tests the relation between the dormant period (the length of time between acquisitions in an industry) and bidder abnormal returns. To calculate dormant periods we sort all bidding firms with CRSP SIC codes chronologically within their primary 4-digit classification. A dormant period is defined as the number of days since a previous acquisition bid was announced by a firm in the bidder's 4 digit CRSP SIC industry. In defining dormant periods we use all available cases with valid CRSP SIC codes even if these firms are deleted because of subsequent screening rules. This procedure enables us to capture the potential shock that all of these firms have on the industry. However, firms without CRSP SIC codes cannot be considered in determining dormant periods. Moreover, there are obviously other shocks to an industry that signal information. These shocks include acquisitions by firms in related but different industries, the existence of merger waves within an industry and the existence of a target firm in the industry. Although we examine the impact of merger waves and control for a firm in the industry being a target, our measure of dormant period cannot capture all conceivable shocks. Nevertheless, to the extent that dormant periods are misclassified we bias against finding significant results.
10 Except where noted we use CRSP (historical) SIC codes. Kahle and Walkling (1996) discuss the advantages, disadvantages, and inconsistencies between Compustat and CRSP SIC codes. In sensitivity tests, we also confirm our primary results regarding dormant periods and abnormal returns using SDC industry classifications. In subsequent tests involving SIC codes for target firms, many of which are private, we use SDC. We note similar differences in classifications between SDC and CRSP. However, since we are not mixing the two sources, this should not be a problem.
We define an "initial industry bidder" as the first firm in an industry to attempt any acquisition bid after a minimum 12-month dormant period. Subsequent bidders are rival firms that announce acquisitions sometime before the next initial bid occurs. By definition, the dormant period for subsequent bidders must be less than 12 months. Non-bidding rivals are those rivals that do not bid before the next initial bidder.
The probability of being an initial industry bidder is directly related to the number of firms in an industry. In the results shown in the tables, we eliminate industries with fewer than five acquisitions and also control for the number of firms in an industry in our multivariate tests. Our main conclusions, however, also hold if we restrict our analysis to industries with greater numbers of firms or acquisitions. For example, similar results obtain if we restrict our analyses to industries with greater than 20 firms.
Since dormant periods are likely to be a function of the number of acquisitions in an industry, we also calculate abnormal dormant periods between acquisitions. Abnormal dormant periods are calculated as the difference in days between the actual and expected dormant periods. Here, 'expected dormant period' is defined by dividing the number of days in our sample (6,209) by the number of acquisitions (plus one) occurring in an industry. Thus, the expected dormant period for an industry with 100 acquisition bids is quite shorter than that for an industry with 30 acquisition bids. Nevertheless, the correlation between our two measures of dormant period (actual and abnormal) is quite high across the sample (0.92).
In our first empirical tests we test three specifications of the dormant period: 1) the level of dormant period in days, 2) a dummy variable indicating initial industry bidders (i.e., dormant periods greater than one year), and 3) the abnormal dormant period. There is reasonable justification for all of these specifications.
The length of time between acquisition bids is indeed the dormant period in an industry. Nevertheless, much financial information is produced annually (e.g., annual reports, yearly analyses by analysts and investment bankers, etc.). Dormant periods less than one year are likely to produce discussion of acquisitions in these analyses and keep the topic alive in the minds of investors. A year without a bid announcement is less likely to result in such a reminder; this suggests the use of a binary variable to identify initial industry bidders.
Finally, the abnormal dormant period recognizes that industries with greater acquisition activity are likely to have shorter expected dormant periods.
One illustration of the dormant period concept is the Steel Works and Blast Furnace Industry (SIC code 3312). Seventeen firms in this industry made acquisition bids over our sample period. Three of these would be classified as initial industry bidders since the preceding dormant periods exceed one year. The length of these three dormant periods is 2,126, 974 and 388 days, respectively. None of the other fourteen bids were preceded by dormant periods lasting more than a year. Since there are seventeen years in our sample, the expected dormant period for this industry is slightly less than one year (6,209 days divided by 18). The abnormal dormant period for the three cases mentioned above is 1,781, 629 and 43 days, respectively.
Distribution of initial industry bidders and active bidders
The fifth column of Table 1 shows the distribution of initial industry bidders (i.e., bids preceded by a dormant period of at least 12 months). A total of 694 bids are classified as initial industry bids. The number of initial industry bidders remains high throughout the mid to late nineties, dropping only at the end of our sample period.
Some of the initial industry bidders make multiple bids within the next year. We will refer to these as 'active initial industry bidders'. This is an empirically based definition of active bidders; it does not necessarily mean that these firms announced an acquisition program. These firms could also be compared to the 'frequent acquirers' of Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) although we do not place restrictions on the number of subsequent bids they make. The last column of Table 1 suggests that the time trend of active initial industry bidders is similar to that of the entire sample.
Distribution of dormant periods
Our first anticipation hypothesis links bidder abnormal returns with the length of the dormant period.
Shorter dormant periods involve more regular bidding activity within an industry. Acquisitions preceded by shorter dormant periods are more likely to be anticipated, thus increasing the likelihood that the stock price has partially adjusted. Since the minimum dormant period to define an initial industry bidder is one year, an industry can contain multiple initial bidders over the entire sample period. Panel B of Table 2 reveals the distribution of initial industry bidders per industry. The mean and median number of initial industry bidders per industry is 3.44 and 3.00, respectively. Thirty industries have only one initial industry bidder over our sample period.
Another 30 industries have two initial industry bidders. One hundred and forty-three industries (70% of our initial bids) have three or more initial industry bidders.
For each of the initial industry bids we check the financial presses (Lexis-Nexis and Factiva) to verify the announcement date and to find any press reports discussing motives for the acquisition and plans for a program of acquisitions. We find press reports listing motives for the bid in 476 of the 694 initial bids.
Dominant motives are listed in Panel C of 
Bidder abnormal returns and industry dormant periods
Abnormal returns classified by dormant period
Daily returns for 240 days (covering the period t-300 through t-61) are used to estimate market model parameters for each bidding firm where day t represents the announcement date. We require a minimum of 100 daily returns, or the case is deleted. The abnormal return on day t is calculated as the difference between actual and estimated returns for the firms analyzed. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) summarize the price impact over the two-day period (-1, 0) surrounding the acquisition announcement. Average standardized abnormal returns and average standardized cumulative abnormal returns are used to create test statistics. Table 3 presents abnormal returns for all bidders, initial industry bidders (i.e., dormant period greater than one year) and for bidders classified by length of the dormant period preceding their bid. As shown in Panel A, the average two-day average abnormal return across all 3,389 bidders is an insignificant 0.18%.
Median abnormal return for all bidding firms is -.10%. Forty-nine percent of these abnormal returns are positive. These results are consistent with the widespread result in the literature that bidders generally break even or lose small amounts at the time of an acquisition announcement.
Panel B contrasts abnormal bidder returns for initial industry bidders with those for firms with industry dormant periods of less than one year. This is the first direct test of Hypothesis one, that abnormal returns will be greater for initial industry bidders. Dormant periods of less than a year are the cases where anticipation effects are most likely to occur. The mean abnormal return for bidders with dormant periods of less than one year is an insignificant 0.05% (t-statistic = 0.31). By contrast, average abnormal returns for initial industry bidders are 0.69% (t-statistic = 3.08). Thus, abnormal returns for bids following a year of bidding inactivity in their industry are 64 basis points higher than bids following shorter industry dormant periods. In addition, about 53% of initial industry bidder abnormal returns are positive, compared to only 48% for bidders with dormant periods less than one year.
Panel C contrasts dormant periods of less than one year to those ranging from one to over five years and beyond five years. Mean and median abnormal bidder returns increase monotonically with these time categories. Mean abnormal returns across the three classifications rise from 0.05% for dormant periods less than one year to 0.63% for one to five year dormant periods and 0.89% for dormant periods exceeding five years. Median abnormal returns across the three categories of increasing dormant periods are -0.20%, 0.30% and 0.55%, respectively. The percentage of firms with positive abnormal returns also rises across the dormant period categories. The increasing pattern of abnormal returns is consistent with our first hypothesis. The importance of the dormant period and the greater returns for less anticipated bids are consistent with the notion that average bidding activity for these firms is a wealth increasing activity.
In Panel D of Table 3 we use the alternate measure of dormant period -the abnormal dormant period.
Results are again consistent with the first hypothesis. Bidders with negative abnormal dormant periods earn insignificant mean (median) abnormal returns of 0.07% (-0.2%). Abnormal returns for bidders with positive abnormal dormant periods earn a significant mean (median) return of 0.50% (0.29%). The difference between these classifications is statistically significant at the 10% level. Finally, while only 48% of the negative abnormal dormant periods produce positive abnormal returns, over 52% of the positive abnormal dormant periods produce positive abnormal returns.
Bidder abnormal returns and industry dormant periods across control variables
The univariate results of the preceding section are consistent with the first hypothesis. In this section
we introduce the control variables we will use in our multivariate tests. These variables can be classified into three categories: variables specific to the deal (e.g., is the deal for stock?), variables related to the target (e.g., is the target public?), and variables related to where the bid occurred in reference to any merger wave for its industry. Deal specific variables include form of payment (cash, stock, mixed), the existence of multiple bidders, form of the acquisition (horizontal, non-horizontal), attitude of the target (friendly, unfriendly), and outcome of the acquisition (successful, failure). Target related variables include organizational form and nationality of the target (public or private; domestic or foreign) and incorporation of the target (Delaware or other). Each of these variables has been linked to the magnitude of bidder returns in the literature.
The first column of Table 4 shows the name and percentage of each attribute in our sample. For example, stock offers comprise 40.6% of our sample. In the paragraphs below we first compare abnormal returns across the attributes (column 3) to results established in the literature. Following this we discuss results for the variables categorized by dormant periods.
Deal Specific Variables
Similar to work dating back to Travlos (1987) , we find that bidders in stock offers earn lower returns than those in cash offers; mixed offers produce returns between stock and cash offers. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and Betton and Eckbo (2000) note that competition lowers bidder returns; bidders in our sample earn significantly positive returns in single bid acquisitions and significantly negative returns in multiple bidder transactions. The literature reports mixed results for differences in bidder returns across horizontal and non-horizontal acquisitions. We find that abnormal returns to bidders involved in horizontal acquisitions are lower than bidders for non-horizontal targets. Bidders in successful acquisitions earn higher mean and median returns than in unsuccessful acquisitions. Schwert (2000) notes the difficulty in identifying hostile offers and reports mixed results for the relation between bid premia and hostility. In our univariate analysis, bidders earn significantly lower returns in hostile offers. This is undoubtedly correlated with results for multiple bidders.
Target Specific Variables
Consistent with the work of Chang (1998), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and others, we find that bidders earn significantly higher returns in acquisitions of private targets. Daines (2001) notes that Delaware firms receive more takeover bids and are more likely to be acquired. We find that bidders pursuing targets incorporated in Delaware earn dramatically lower returns. If these firms do receive more takeover bids, this result could be correlated with the effect of competition. Returns to bidders targeting foreign firms are insignificantly different from bidders targeting domestic firms. These findings are different from those of Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) ; however, multivariate results in the next section are consistent with their findings.
Wave Related Variables
Recent work exploring clustering of acquisitions and merger waves includes Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) , Andrade and Stafford (2004) , Harford (2005) , Akbulut and Matsusaka (2003) , and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). As we have noted, dormant periods are not necessarily followed by a merger wave. Conversely, the technologies used to identify merger waves usually do not require a dormant period before the beginning of the wave. Instead, a wave is identified by a clustering of acquisition activity which may or may not be preceded by other acquisitions in the industry. Nevertheless, it makes sense to examine how our results compare to established evidence on merger waves. Valuation effects for bidders can differ by their activity before, during or after a wave. We test the effects of waves using the definitions of Harford (2005) .
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In our analysis of merger waves we are interested in several questions. First, how many of our initial industry bids occur before, during, or after a wave? Second, do we note different results for bids (and initial bids) occurring at different parts of a wave? Two differences in our methodology and that of Harford should be noted. First we use a more detailed description of industry. In comparison to the 48 industries of FamaFrench (1997) we have 313 unique four-digit SIC industries. Also, Harford's activity measure includes both bidder and target activity while our focus is on bidders. For both of these reasons, we often find a lag between the beginning date of the wave and our first bidding activity. Since his measure includes target activity as well this serves as another check on how our results would be altered by target related activity. 12 We are grateful to Jarrad Harford for supplying us with names and dates of the merger waves he identifies. To identify waves Harford calculates the maximum 24 month period of merger intensity in the 1980s and also in the 1990s for each of the Fama-French 48 industries. Merger intensity is defined to include both target and bidder activity. These periods of maximum intensity are 'potential' waves. Next, he simulates the highest 24 month level of activity for each industry assuming the activity had occurred randomly. Merger waves are those two year periods of intensity exceeding the 95th percentile from the distribution. There is no requirement that they be preceded by a dormant period.
We code each bidder by where it is in a wave using the three dummy variables defined in Harford (2005) . Pre-wave is equal to one if the bid occurs in the 12 months before a wave; in-wave is equal to one for bids within 24 months of the start of a wave, and post wave is equal to one for bids within 36 months after the end of a wave.
Results in Panel J reveal that the bulk of all bids (46%) occur in periods unrelated to waves.
Consistent with our statement that "initial industry bids are different from the analysis of waves", we note that 64% (447 out of 694 bids) of initial bids (i.e., dormant periods greater than a year) are unrelated to waves.
Univariate results indicate that bidders earn significantly greater returns in the pre-wave period and in periods unrelated to waves. Conversely, they earn significantly negative returns in the post wave period. 13 14 Finally, Panel K examines abnormal returns for consolidating, expanding, and stable industries. At the time of an acquisition bid we examine the size and growth of the four digit SIC (CRSP) industry. We define consolidating industries as those where number of firms decreased more than 20% compared to previous year.
Expanding industries are those where the number of firms increased more than 20% compared to the previous year. The remaining industries are defined as stable.
Results for different dormant periods across specific variables
Before considering the effects of anticipation, our results for each of the variables from Table 4 are similar to the literature. After considering anticipation, however, we will show that some well established results disappear. For example, bidders in less anticipated stock offers earn significantly positive abnormal returns, a result opposite to conventional wisdom. Bidders in less anticipated acquisitions of public targets 13 In sensitivity tests, we also examine results across different types of waves. Harford's (2004) Table 2 gives reasons for each of the waves he identifies. We sort these reasons into four categories and classify our in-wave bidders accordingly: consolidation, deregulation, information technology, and growth. We note similar insignificant results for announcement period returns across these categories. The only exception is service industries which have significantly positive announcement period abnormal returns. 14 We also investigate the use of governance variables. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2005) report a significant negative relation between the existence of anti-takeover provisions and acquirer returns. Unfortunately, our sample size drops by about two thirds if we attempt to include either the GIM index, the E index from Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) , or the existence of staggered boards. In this reduced sample (of primarily larger firms), we do not find these variables significantly related to bidding firm returns in our multivariate analysis.
earn insignificant abnormal returns. This is in contrast to the significantly negative abnormal returns noted in the literature. Both results are consistent with anticipation. We elaborate on these results in the tables below.
To examine the impact of anticipation across each control variable we present abnormal returns for dormant periods either less than or beyond one year in columns four and five, respectively. Results for positive and negative abnormal dormant periods are shown in columns six and seven. The table reveals the impact of dormant periods while controlling for specific control variables. Thus, we compare column five with column four and column seven with column six. The large quantity of information detailed in the table can be difficult to comprehend. The differences across smaller and larger dormant periods are revealed in the last two columns of Table 4 and more succinctly, in Figure 1 . These differences are overwhelmingly positive.
This is true for means, for medians and for both measures of dormant periods. Across almost all classifications, bidders in less anticipated acquisitions (i.e., with longer dormant periods) earn larger returns.
Mean abnormal returns for dormant periods of greater than one year are larger than returns in shorter dormant periods for 18 of the 21 categories examined. Mean returns are significantly different in nine of these categories. Median abnormal returns for longer dormant periods are larger than returns in shorter dormant periods for 19 of 21 categories examined. Median returns are significantly different at the 10% (5%) level in 12 (11) of these categories. These results provide strong support for the first anticipation hypothesis.
Moreover, we are using a conservative two-tailed test to examine a one-tailed hypothesis.
Column 9 shows the significance levels for differences between returns of abnormal dormant periods greater than zero and those less than zero. Mean abnormal returns for longer abnormal dormant periods are larger in 18 of the 21 categories examined; they are significantly different in six of these categories. Median abnormal returns for longer abnormal dormant periods are larger in 19 of 21 categories. Median returns are significantly different at the 5% level in nine of these categories. As before, the pervasive nature of larger returns in longer dormant periods while controlling for a variety of variables determining bidder returns provides strong support for anticipation. Table 5 contains a multivariate analysis of our first hypothesis. In particular, we examine the relation between bidder abnormal returns and dormant periods while controlling for other potentially important variables. The sample consists of all bidding firms including initial and subsequent bidders. The dependent variable is the abnormal return earned by each bidder at the time of their own bid announcement.
Multivariate Analysis of the anticipation hypothesis
All regressions control for the number of firms in an industry. 15 The first regression uses bidder, target, and deal specific variables. Regression two combines these variables with dummy variables identifying waves as specified in Harford (2005) . Regression three adds interaction terms to capture any differential effect of initial industry bidders in waves. Regressions four through six use alternate specifications of the dormant period. In regression four, we replace the single dummy variable for initial industry bidders with two dummy variables for dormant periods between one and five years and dormant periods greater than five years. In regression five we use the continuous specification of dormant period rather than dummy variables.
In regression six we use the abnormal dormant period.
In all but the last specification (using the abnormal dormant period), the results are consistent with the first anticipation hypothesis: bidder abnormal returns are significantly positive for initial industry bidders, for dormant periods between one and five years and for the continuous definition of dormant period. For example, results of the first regression suggest that after adding relevant control variables, abnormal returns for bids following dormant periods longer than one year are 73 basis points higher than bids following shorter industry dormant periods. In our most complete model specification (regression 3), the differential rises to 114 basis points. In sensitivity results not shown, continuous and discrete specifications of the dormant period are also significantly, positively related to the absolute value of abnormal returns. 
5.
Are subsequent bidder returns anticipated?
Differentiating initial bidders, subsequent bidders, non-bidders, and targets
Our second and third hypotheses contrast initial bidders with subsequent bidders and with nonbidding rivals. Consequently, we begin by examining characteristics of these firms. To meaningfully link financial characteristics with rival firms, we define subsequent bidders as those rivals that announce a bid sometime before the next initial industry bid occurs; "non-bidding rivals" do not announce a bid in this period.
We do not require the subsequent bidder to target a firm in the same industry as targeted by the initial bidder.
Also, since we are interested in the anticipation of information across firms in an industry (rather than a detailed examination of program bids) we eliminate subsequent bids made by the initial bidders themselves. In calculating abnormal returns we remove 51cases (out of 10,745) where non-bidding rivals were targeted at the time of initial industry bidder. In addition, we check all subsequent bidders to determine if any were targeted by the initial industry bidder. We found and removed one case.
Appendix A reports the results of logistic analyses contrasting initial bidders and other types of firms. Obviously there is an infinite variety of variables we could examine. Some interesting variables (e.g., ownership), are unavailable to us; others (e.g., governance) severely restrict the number of observations. Our objective here is not to perform a definitive analysis of these types of firms, but to illustrate general differences among them and to ascertain whether these differences are evident at the time of an initial bid. We focus on a small set of candidate variables identified in the literature with bidding firms. Variables measuring size, profitability, liquidity, leverage, Tobin's Q, and research and development expenditures are measured at the year end prior to the corresponding initial industry bid. To avoid longer time lags and the obsolescence of information, we focus here on subsequent bids within a year of the initial bid. Regression one of Appendix A reveals that initial industry bidders are larger, more profitable (measured by the ratio of EBITDA/total assets), more levered, have higher Q ratios and have lower levels of R&D than rival firms. Regression two contrasts the initial and subsequent bidders. Initial bidders are smaller, with more leverage, lower Q ratios and higher levels of R&D. Regression three illustrates similar attributes for subsequent bidders in comparison to non-bidding rivals. Like initial bidders, subsequent bidders are larger and more profitable, with higher Q ratios and less R&D than non-bidding rivals. The important point here is that the sign and significance of variables associated with subsequent bidders are the same as those of the initial bidders. Thus, observable characteristics differentiate subsequent bidders from non-bidding rivals.
For reasons that will become apparent in the next section, regression four contrasts target firms with their non-targeted rivals. In our sample, targets are smaller and more profitable, have lower Q ratios, lower levels of R&D, and surprisingly higher leverage. We were concerned that profitability and Tobin's Q could be highly correlated and affect our results; entering each variable independently does not affect our conclusions.
Abnormal returns to rivals at the time of the initial bid
Hypothesis two relates the abnormal returns earned by subsequent bidders to those earned by nonbidding rivals at the time of the initial industry bidder. Here, our tests of anticipation examine whether the prices of rivals and subsequent bidding firms adjust at the time of the initial industry bid, a time at which the identities of subsequent bidders are unknown. Table 6 the mean abnormal return is 0.27% with a t-statistic of 2.14. In addition, the return they do earn is between the 0.01% return to non-bidders and the abnormal returns of 0.69% earned by the initial industry bidders. Results from Appendix A (discussed above) indicate that at the time of an initial industry bid, there are significant, observable differences between non-bidders and subsequent bidders. The results in Table 6 are consistent with the notion that the market identifies subsequent bidders at the time of the initial industry bid and adjusts their prices upward.
In the next two panels of Table 6 we test whether rivals react to the sign of the initial bidder's return.
Absent anticipation effects there is no direct linkage between initial industry bidder returns and the magnitude or sign of simultaneously measured returns for rival firms. Results of these panels show that mean and median returns to subsequent bidders measured at the time of the initial industry bidder, are significantly positive for the positive initial industry bidders and significantly negative for the negative initial industry 17 Collusion could predict positive abnormal returns to rivals but not the fact that they are only earned by subsequent bidders. In contrast, a first mover advantage would predict negative returns to all rivals. 
Direct tests of the anticipation hypothesis
The magnitude of the initial bidder's abnormal return is a potential signal of the degree of information this announcement contains for rival firms. Hypothesis three suggests a stronger implication of anticipation than the hypothesis two: prices of subsequent bidders will adjust proportionally to the return earned by the initial industry bidder and this adjustment will be greater than that of non-bidding rivals. We test this hypothesis with the following equation:
The dependent variable is again the abnormal return for each rival at the time their initial industry bid is announced. We regress this against the contemporaneous return earned by the initial bidder (initial industry bidder CAR or IIBCAR). We also specify dummy variables for subsequent bidders, (SBDUM) and the interaction of these terms. This allows the slope and intercept of our regressions to vary for subsequent bidders and non-bidding rivals. The interaction variable, IIBCAR*SBDUM captures the differential slope 18 An intriguing question is whether the return earned by firms at the time of an initial bid influences the degree of subsequent activity in the industry. That is, do potential bidders learn from the sign of the initial bidders return and bid or not bid accordingly? As one simple test, we examined the percentage of bids in an industry following positive and negative initial bids. We find no significant difference. 19 In results not shown we test whether initial returns have sufficient explanatory power in multivariate logisitic regressions using a dummy variable equal to one for firms that are subsequent bidders. In three regressions (for all cases, positive initial bidder returns, and negative initial bidder returns), and using size, profitability, liquidity, leverage, Tobin's Q and R&D as control variables, the abnormal return at the time of the initial industry bid is significant in differentiating subsequent bidders from non-bidders.
coefficient for subsequent bidders with respect to changes in magnitude of the initial bidders' abnormal returns. Thus, the sum of coefficients for IIBCAR and IIBCAR*SBDUM reveal the change in the abnormal return to subsequent bidders with respect to different levels of initial bidder return.
Results are shown in Table 7 . Regression one reveals that the abnormal return to all rivals is significantly related to the contemporaneous return of the initial industry bidder. However, this result doesn't distinguish non-bidding rivals from rivals that become subsequent bidders. In the remaining regressions, we add intercept and slope terms to differentiate subsequent bidders from non-bidding rivals. Throughout the table we find that the intercept dummy coefficients for subsequent bidders are insignificant; conditional on the magnitude of the initial bidder's return, there is no significant difference between the level of abnormal returns earned by subsequent bidder's and non-bidding rivals. However, abnormal returns to subsequent bidders are significantly related to the magnitude of the initial bidder's return in all regressions. In all but one case, the slope coefficient for subsequent bidders is significantly different from non-bidding rivals. Thus, the return to the subsequent bidders adjusts in proportion to the degree of information associated with the initial industry bid. In contrast, the coefficient to non-bidding rivals (implicit in the coefficient on the initial bidder's abnormal return) is only significant in two cases, regression six and regression four. In regression six, it is marginally significant at the 10% level. The results of regressions three and four split the sample by the market's reaction (positive or negative) to the initial industry bid. Only subsequent bidders experience a price reaction at the time a positive initial industry bid is announced. However, when the reaction to an initial industry bid is negative, the prices of all rivals adjust. When initial industry bidding is good news, the market adjusts the prices of subsequent bidders only. Bad news, however, is reflected throughout the industry. Bad news is often associated with the use of stock as a form of payment. In unreported results we split the sample by whether the initial bid was for cash or stock. The slope coefficient for subsequent bidders remains positive and significant in cash offers but is insignificant in stock offers. Of course, at the time of the initial industry bid, the identity of subsequent bidders is unknown. Thus, differential results for subsequent bidders are strongly consistent with the third anticipation hypothesis. 20
Do rival prices react because they are subsequent targets?
It could be argued that the result concerning subsequent bidders is driven by anticipation of these firms being subsequent targets. Of course, even if this were true -the explanation is still one of anticipation -just not of the sort we envision.
We are skeptical of the 'subsequent target' explanation in this setting for two reasons. First, we have already removed cases where rival firms are targeted on the same dates as their initial industry bid announcement -thus large gains to targets cannot be driving our results. Second, if the 'subsequent target' explanation explains the rival price reaction, subsequent bidders should have the same characteristics as target firms; the literature and our logistic analysis finds well known differences, especially size. However, in tests available upon request we find that the probability of being a subsequent target is actually lower for subsequent bidding rivals than for either initial bidders or non-bidding rivals.
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Also surprising, and inconsistent with the subsequent target idea, the percentage of subsequent bidders acquired is lowest in the horizontal bids.
As a second check of the subsequent target story, we rerun all our analyses after removing all cases where firms are acquired in the next three years. Our conclusions are unaltered. In similar fashion, we add a dummy variable for firms that were subsequent targets to regressions five and six of Table 7 . In regression six, we also add a dummy variable for horizontal offers and an interaction term to recognize subsequent targets in horizontal offers. None of these variables are significant, and our conclusions remain unaltered.
However, firms could bid to avoid being a target and could successfully insulate themselves. Thus, it is necessary to examine an ex ante measure of the probability of being a target. To do this, we perform similar analyses adding the predicted probability of being a target from regression 4 of the Appendix A.
Regressions seven and eight reveal that none of these variables are significant at conventional levels. More importantly, the conclusions regarding our other variables remain unchanged.
Alternate explanations
At this point we note that our primary findings are consistent with anticipation. First, abnormal returns to bidding firms are significantly greater for initial industry bids and increase with a direct measure of surprise, the length of the dormant period. Second, abnormal returns to subsequent bidders in the same industry are different from those to non-bidding rivals at the announcement of initial industry bid and they change in direct proportion to the abnormal returns of the initial industry bidder. These reactions by rival firms are confined to those firms that subsequently bid and are not found in non-bidding rivals. We have noted sensitivity tests regarding: the specification of the dormant period, our concern about the subsequent target explanation and our specification of variables throughout the text. In the paragraphs below we briefly examine two alternate explanations for our first and second results: that returns increase with the dormant period and that subsequent bidders react.
The first mover hypothesis
An alternate explanation for the significant abnormal returns to initial industry bidders is the first mover hypothesis. 22 Under this hypothesis, initial industry bidders earn abnormal returns because their actions create a strategic advantage over rival firms. Frequently cited first mover advantages include increased market share, heightened brand recognition, enhanced distribution networks, increased brand loyalty, the ability to set product standards, and increased experience. Any one of these advantages could be achieved through acquisitions thus giving an initial bidder a competitive edge over rival firms. Nevertheless, there are also first 21 To check whether bad bidders become good targets, [Mitchell and Lehn (1990) ] we separate our initial bidders into the 368 cases with positive initial returns and the 330 cases with negative initial returns. In our sample, 'bad bidders' have a 14% chance of being acquired in the next three years which is less than the 18% for bidders with positive abnormal returns. 22 The first mover hypothesis gets extensive coverage in the strategy literature. For a recent examination see Carow, Heron and Saxton (2004) . In the finance literature see Akdogu (2003) . (2001) and Schnaars (1994) examine first mover advantages and disadvantages noting numerous cases where the imitator ultimately gains the advantage over the first mover.
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If first movers (initial industry bidders) create a strategic advantage over rivals, we would expect the returns of rival firms to decrease when an initial industry bid is announced. In contrast, our univariate tests reported in Table 6 , indicate that rivals earn insignificantly positive returns at the initial bid announcement; the only rivals that earn significant returns are subsequent bidders and they earn positive returns.
Empirical analysis of the first mover hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we can assert the independent importance of the anticipation hypothesis. Two arguments support this claim. First, abnormal returns increase with the length of the dormant period. This result is predicted by the anticipation hypothesis but not the pure form of the first mover hypothesis. Although the first mover hypothesis could be adjusted to assert greater advantages following longer dormant periods, the theory would need to be developed and incorporate reasons why competitive pressures did not also shorten the dormant period. That is, if gains increase with the dormant period, bidders would be encouraged to bid more quickly. We also find adjustment of the prices for subsequent bidders across all forms of acquisitions. The differential return of these firms at the time of the initial industry bid is the most direct evidence of anticipation.
Bidding effect or industry co-movement
It is possible that some of the effects of Table 7 are driven by the transfer of general industry information rather than acquisition effects but the differential effect for subsequent bidders is a direct contradiction to this assertion. Nevertheless, we also test for general information effects by using a nonannouncement day rather than the time of the initial industry bid. We arbitrarily chose our non-bidding day to be 60 days before the initial bid announcement and reestimate Table 7 . In results not shown, we find that the 23 Examples from the software industry include the success of VHS tape format over Betamax, IBM following Apple, and Excel following VisiCalc. Cottrell and Sick (2001) also note the phenomena in the motorcycle industry with Yamaha, Kawasaki, and Suzuki successfully following Harley Davidson, the Indian and many European models.
abnormal returns of rivals and subsequent bidders are unrelated to the abnormal return of (what will become) the initial industry bidder. We conclude that the results of Table 7 are not driven by ordinary transfers of industry information but are unique to the dramatic events such as the initial industry bidding announcement.
Conclusions
A bid announcement can signal information about bidding and target firms and their respective industries. Apart from early work on program bids, the literature has not given much attention to the effect of anticipation on a bidder's return or on the returns of rivals. Nevertheless, the existence of anticipation is important to recognize, particularly given the small magnitude of returns associated with bidding firms. Any measurable effect due to anticipation is likely to be a sizeable portion of announcement period returns.
This paper develops and tests the bidder anticipation hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that bidder returns will be positively related to the degree of surprise. In addition, prices of rival firms will adjust at the time of the initial industry bid. If the market correctly anticipates which rivals will become subsequent bidders and if bidding is expected to affect value, their abnormal returns will differ from those of non-bidding rivals. Moreover, the abnormal returns of these subsequent bidders will adjust in proportion to the magnitude Table 1 : Distribution of acquisition bids over the sample period. The sample consists of all US bidders on the SDC database announcing both domestic and international acquisition bids above $10 million over the period 1/1/1985 through 12/31/2001. This produces an initial sample of 14,564 deals. We delete cases where CRSP SIC codes or CRSP returns are not available to calculate abnormal returns. We also delete bidders in industries with a small number of firms and acquisitions (initially this is defined as fewer than five firms or acquisitions). This results in a sample of 3389 bidders. "An initial industry bidder" is the first firm in a 4-digit CRSP SIC code to make a bid after a minimum 12-month dormant period without bids by other firms in the industry. Table 2 : Distribution of dormant periods and initial industry bidder activity. Panel A shows the distribution of dormant periods. To calculate dormant periods we first sort each of the 3389 acquisition bids chronologically within each four digit (CRSP) industry. A dormant period is defined as the length of time since a previous bidding announcement in the same 4-digit CRSP industry. "An initial industry bidder" is the first firm in a 4-digit CRSP SIC code to make a bid after a minimum 12-month dormant period. In row 1, results for all bidders are used. Row 2 presents results for all initial industry bidders. Row 3 presents results for initial industry bidders making additional bid(s) within a year. The last row shows the distribution of abnormal dormant periods calculated by subtracting the expected dormant period (days in the sample/# acquisitions in the industry) from the actual dormant period. Panel B shows the number of industries and the associated number of initial industry bidders over the sample period. Panel C presents motives mentioned in the financial press for the 694 initial industry bidders. and non-bidders' abnormal returns to initial bidder's abnormal returns. All returns are measured at the time of the initial industry bidder. The dependent variable is the subsequent bidder's and non-bidders' abnormal return over the two-day announcement period (-1, 0) for the initial industry bidder. The independent variables are the initial industry bidders' abnormal return measured over the same period (IIBCAR) and a dummy variable to recognize the existence of a subsequent bidder dummy (SBDUM). Positive and Negative refer to the sign of the initial bidder's announcement return. We also use dummy variables to identify cases where the initial bid was horizontal (same 4-digit SIC) and where a firm was actually targeted subsequent to the initial bid. Probability of being a target is a continuous variable as forecast from regression four of the appendix. T-statistics, adjusted for clustered data, are shown in parentheses. Since initial bidder's returns are used as independent variables, they are not included in the regressions. 
Panel A: The distribution of dormant periods
